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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While each of the parties have previously set forth the
statement of the case in their earlier briefs, Golden Meadows
and Crowleys are compelled to correct the purposeful omissions
and misrepresentations contained in Coons' Statement of the
Case in Brief of Appellees.
In February, 1994, Coons was in the midst of constructing
the home in question and was advertising it for sale. At the
time Mrs. Crowley entered into the Real Estate Purchase
Contract, the home was far from being

completed.

Her

agreement to purchase the home was contingent upon Coons first
completing the home as the parties had agreed.

This he never

did. Several of the upgrades about which Coons complains were
upgrades which he agreed would be included in the agreed upon
purchase.

It is a misrepresentation of the facts for Coonses

to state that the upgrades desired by Mrs. Crowley were over
and above what was agreed on between the parties.

This was

the precise issue at the heart of the dispute between the
parties as to which upgrades were to have been reasonably
included in the purchase price and which ones were not.
By July, 1994, Coons was in a desperate situation.

He

had run out of money and could not complete construction of
the home without additional cash and the construction loan was
due.

It was at this time that he approached the Crowleys to

see if they would close on the unfinished home, if he promised
to complete construction after closing when he would receive
the sales proceeds.

By this time Mrs. Crowley had already

spent tens of thousands of dollars on the home, in addition to
the purchase price, paying Coons' subcontractors, paying for
various items of materials used in the construction of the
home, and even paying for upgrades that Coons had promised to
pay for, not to mention the upgrades that were over and above
her contract with Mr. Coons. Crowleys told Coons that when he
finished construction of their home as agreed that they would
close. He never completed construction as agreed resulting in
the Crowleys refusing to close.
In July, 1994, when Crowleys refused to close on their
partially finished home, and further refused to advance any
more funds to Coons, Coons walked off the job claiming breach.
Construction on the home was never completed by Coons and the
inspections he refers to in his statement of facts were rough
inspections only, not final inspections.

It is simply untrue

that Mr. Coons had scheduled all required work on the house
and then canceled it when the Crowleys refused to close.

It

is also untrue that Coons had to renegotiate the terms of his
construction with Zions Mortgage because Mrs. Crowley refused
to close. By July, 1994, Coons had successfully obtained four
(4) separate extensions of his construction loan from Zions
Mortgage Company, despite the fact that he had never made a
-2-

payment on the loan.

Coons did not obtain any further

extensions of his construction loan after July 18, 1994, after
Crowleys refused to close on their partially completed home,
contrary to his statement of the case.
went into default.

Thereafter, the loan

Again, the point must be emphasized that

throughout this entire matter, Coons never made a single
payment on the construction loan for money he borrowed to
build this home.
Coons

is critical of the fact that Golden Meadows

purchased the construction loan from Zions Mortgage Company.
In fact he has even gone so far as to allege that Golden
Meadows and Michael Crowley are one in the same, or that one
is the alter ego of the other. That is simply not true. They
are two separate and distinct legal entities, even though Mr.
Crowley

is the president of Golden Meadows.

Mr. Coons

conveniently omits the fact that Golden Meadows was forced to
purchase the construction loan from Zions Mortgage to protect
the significant sums of money that had been invested in the
home by Golden Meadows and Mrs. Crowley, due to Coonses'
threats and attempts to sell the home to a third party.
Golden Meadows engaged in no wrongful conduct in purchasing
the construction loan and in fact paid Zions Mortgage nearly
$177,000.00

for

said

note.

Golden

Meadows

would

have

preferred not to pay out nearly $177,000 in cash for the
construction note to protect the interests of Mrs. Crowley and
-3-

itself.

However, Coons' wrongful conduct

left them no

alternative. Coons also conveniently fails to tell the Court
that on the date that Golden Meadows delivered its money to
Zions Mortgage for the construction loan that Coons was
already in default on the note. Remember, Coons never made a
single payment on the construction loan.

Contrary to his

assertions, Coons never tendered or delivered to Golden
Meadows the full amount due under the terms and conditions of
the Construction Loan Agreement and Trust Deed Note to cure
his default.

For him to say otherwise is a purposeful

misstatement of the truth.
Mr. Coons operated without a contractor's license, in
violation of the law, for more than 14 months.

He knew very

well that he had not paid the required registration fee, but
took no action to cure this defect, until he was caught and
pleaded guilty in late 1994.
The

Coonses

continue

to

mislead

misrepresenting the Arbitration Award.

this

Court

by

It was Coonses who

sued Mrs. Crowley for breach of contract for refusing to
close, which claims Mrs. Crowley defended.

In response

thereto, the arbitrator found that "failure to close the
sale...did not constitute a breach of the contract." There is
no finding in the Arbitration Award that "Neither party had
breached the Real Estate Contract" as the Coonses allege.
A further misrepresentation by Coonses is the claim that
-4-

the arbitrator gave both parties "specific direction how to
resolve the matter by having the work completed on the home by
Mr. Coons and Mr. and Mrs. Crowley closing on the home within
thirty days".

Coons conveniently omits the fact that despite

this directive by the arbitrator, Coons refused to complete
construction on the home and went so far as to cutting off the
power to the home in an attempt to prevent Crowleys from
completing

construction

on the home without

him.

The

undeniable truth is that Coons never completed construction on
the home and by virtue of the contract which he entered into
with Mrs. Crowley was never entitled to any payment.

The

final paragraph of Coons' statement of facts is a prime
example of how the arbitrator, exceeded his powers by refusing
to award Golden Meadows its late charges and interest.
Coons' statement of the case is a purposeful attempt to
mislead this court through omitting and misstating the true
facts in this case, which conduct should be sanctioned.
Having demonstrated that his entire version of the facts is
misleading or false, suffice it to say that the Court should
rely upon Golden Meadows' and Crowleys statement of the case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Arbitration Award and Supplement to Arbitration Award
must be vacated because the arbitrator exceeded his powers and
-5-

failed to follow the law.

It does not matter that the

arbitrator was the former chief justice of the Utah Supreme
Court.

What

matters

is that the

legal

standards

and

principles that govern the resolutions of disputes in this
state apply equally across the board to tribunals, courts of
law, arbitration proceedings and other forms of dispute
resolution.

None of Coonses' arguments in support of the

Arbitration Award and Supplement to Arbitration Award are
persuasive, and they factual his is mostly a one-sided version
laced with half truths, innuendos, misrepresentations and out
right lies.
This Court has the opportunity to correct a fundamental
injustice in our arbitration procedure, under various legal
theories. Failure to do so will compromise and jeopardize the
future of alternative dispute resolution in this state.

ARGUMENT

POINT I:
THE ARBITRATION AWARD AND THE SUPPLEMENT TO ARBITRATION AWARD
MUST BE VACATED AS A MATTER OF LAW

A.

This Court must not be unduly influenced by virtue of who
the arbitrator was
It is no secret that the parties to this matter agreed on

an arbitrator, selecting Gordon R. Hall, retired chief justice
-6-

of the Utah Supreme Court. Golden Meadows, Crowleys and their
counsel respect Mr. Hall and give him due deference for his
past accomplishments on the bench. Nevertheless, they submit
that when he agreed to act as an arbitrator in this matter, he
also agreed to be bound by the governing laws. Golden Meadows
and Crowleys submit that ample evidence exists demonstrating
that the arbitrator did not follow the law or apply the
correct legal standards.
Rather

than

substantively

examine

the

arbitration

proceeding and resulting awards, Coons focuses this Courts
attention on the identity of the arbitrator. Coons' brief in
this matter is just under seventeen (17) full pages from
beginning to end. Within those seventeen (17) pages, Coonses
made 31 references to the arbitrator, Gordon Hall, in one form
or another.

In every instance their reference to him was

preceded with the title "the honorable", "judge" or "former
chief justice".

Several pages of Coons' Brief make multiple

references to the arbitrator with page 7 containing seven (7)
such references.
Rather than succinctly and substantively addressing the
merits of this action, Coonses have engaged in a blatant
attempt to cloud the issues and this Court's independent
judgment through constant reminder of who the.arbitrator was,
thereby attempting to improperly influence this Court to
affirm the Arbitration Award simply because of who served as
-7-

the arbitrator. Anyone who has known or associated with Gordon
R. Hall likes him.

He is a warm, pleasant and personable

individual who is enjoyable to be around.

Nevertheless,

Golden Meadows and Crowley submit that, with all due respect
to former Chief Justice Hall, his personality characteristics,
past accomplishments and years of service, his former position
has absolutely nothing to do with this matter.

What is at

issue is whether his arbitration ruling is consistent with the
very laws that he helped fashion and develop. In this regard,
Golden Meadows and Crowleys respectfully submit that his
Arbitration Award and Supplement to Arbitration Award fly in
the face of long established legal principles and must be
vacated.
Golden Meadows and Crowleys believe that this Court is
capable of examining the merits of this matter, without regard
to the identity of the arbitrator and independent of our
personal feelings of fondness, admiration and respect which we
all have for him.
B.

Equity is not available to rewrite Golden Meadows7 and
Crowley's Contracts with the Coonses
It is undisputed that the arbitrator attempted to do

equity in rendering his decision.

It is further undisputed

that the arbitrator failed, for whatever reason, to apply
applicable

law

in fashioning his Arbitration

Supplement to Arbitration Award.
-8-

Award

and

It is a fundamental rule

that equity cannot be invoked to change rights defined and
established by law, or in this case by contract, or to create
.a right which otherwise does not exist. See, First State Bank
& Trust Co. of Shawnee v. Wholesale Enterprises, Inc., 883
P.2d 207 (Okl. App. 1994).
Neither Golden Meadows nor Crowleys submitted to the
arbitrator their various contracts with the Coonses for the
arbitrator to construe or interpret the language thereof.
Rather,

Golden

Meadows

and

Crowleys

presented

to

the

arbitrator their respective contracts with the Coonses for
enforcement of the terms thereof. Golden Meadows and Crowleys
did not bargain for or agree to have the arbitrator interpret,
construe or rewrite their respective contracts with the
Coonses. They cannot be forced to arbitrate the construction,
interpretation and meaning of their respective contracts with
Coonses, and the arbitrator in doing so exceeded his powers
under the arbitration act. See, Western Employers Ins. Co. v.
Jefferies & Co., 958 F.2d (9th Cir. 1992).
The arbitrator, in seeking equity, exceeded his
powers by failing to apply equity within the proper bounds of
the law.

As a general rule, equity is not available to

reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away.
Thornblad v. Thornblad, 849 P.2d 1197 (Ut. App. 1993); Hill v.
Hill, 841 P.2d 772 (Ut. App. 1992).

Simply put, a court, or

an arbitrator, in equity will not assist one in extricating
-9-

himself from the circumstances which he has created, either by
action or by contract. See, Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil
& Gas Co, 899 P.2d 766, 772 (Utah 1995). While a court, or an
arbitrator, sitting in equity exercises discretion in granting
or denying relief, it does not have authority to ignore
existing principles of law in favor of its own view of the
equities.

Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666 (Ut. App. 1992).

This is preciously what was done by the arbitrator in this
action.

With the best of intentions, the arbitrator ignored

the plain, clear and unambiguous language of Golden Meadows7
and Crowley's respective contracts with the Coonses in favor
of what he concluded to be an "equitable" result.
cannot

do.

Golden Meadows

and

Crowleys

submit

This he
that an

arbitrator is, or should be, governed by the same legal
principles and guidelines that laws that govern a court of
law.

A court of equity cannot make a contract which it thinks

the parties can agree to, it can only enforce the existing
agreement, Genest v. John Glenn Corp. , 696 P.2d 1058 (Or.
1985).

Likewise arbitrators are or should be governed by the

same legal principles. Inter-City Gas Corp. v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 845 P.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1988) (although an arbitrator may
interpret ambiguous language of a contract, the arbitrator may
not disregard or modify unambiguous contract provisions);
Coast Trading Co. v. Pacific Molasses Co. , 681 F.2d 1195 (9th
Cir. 1982)(where the arbitrators exceeded the authority given
-10-

them by consent of the parties by arbitrarily extending the
contract delivery date, the arbitration award is invalid).
In the instant action, the arbitrator ignored: 1) the
plain and unambiguous contract provisions which award costs
and attorney's fees to Mrs- Crowley and interest, late fees,
penalties, costs and attorney's fees to Golden Meadows; and 2)
the statue which precluded Mr. Coons from bringing the instant
action or obtaining any recovery thereunder in the first
place. This Court would not hesitate to reverse these errors
of law on appeal from a lower court.
this

Court

should

take

a

No reason exists why

different

approach

from

an

arbitration proceeding.
All that Golden Meadows and Mrs. Crowley are seeking is
a determination by this Court that the same legal principles
that govern legal proceedings will also govern arbitration
proceedings,
principles.

and

then

have

this

Court

enforce

those

To do otherwise is to establish "arbitrary" not

arbitration proceedings which violate public policy and trust
and

erode the use and effectiveness of arbitration and

alternative dispute resolution proceedings in this state.
Federal courts have never limited their scope of review of
arbitration awards to a strict reading of 9 U.S.C. §10 but
rather have traditionally subjected arbitration awards to sort
of an

"abuse of discretion" standard, viewed

either as

inherent appurtenance to a right of judicial review or as a
-11-

broad interpretation of § 10(d) prohibiting arbitrators from
exceeding their powers. Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Secur.,
Inc. , 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1998).

This Court should do

likewise
C.

A clear and unambiguous contract must be enforced
Since

the

rules

for construction

of

contracts are

essentially the same in law and equity, 17A Am. Jur. 2d
Contracts §336

(1993), a review of those rules would be

instructive in this matter.

It is a basic rule of contract

law that a court cannot and will not rewrite an unambiguous
contract to make it more "equitable".

See, Provo City Corp.

v. Nielsen Scott Co., Ins., 603 P.2d 8034 (Utah 1979); 17A Am.
Jur. 2d Contracts §§ 340, 341 (1993) . When the meaning of a
contract is clear and unambiguous, it is to be interpreted as
a matter of law. Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co. ,
899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 340
(1993).

Where the language of a contract is clear and

unambiguous, as it is in the instant action, it is the duty of
the court to enforce the contract as made by the parties.
Ryan v. Board of County Com'rs for Gallatin County, 620 P.2d
1203 (Mont. 1980); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 337 (1993).
Golden

Meadows

and

Crowley

submit

that

these

rules of

construction apply not only to judges and courts but also to
arbitrators and alternative dispute resolution proceedings.
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D.

Mrs, Crowley is entitled to an award of costs and
attorney's fees
The Coonses commenced this action against Mrs, Crowley by

filing a complaint against her wherein they alleged that she
was in breach or default of the terms of the Real Estate
Purchase Contract by refusing to close when demanded to do so
by Coonses.

As a result of Coons7 unilateral demands to for

Mrs, Crowley to close on the home in question prior to its
completion, Mrs. Crowley incurred various costs and was forced
to retain counsel to defend her Coons' outrageous demands.
The arbitrator specifically found in the Arbitration Award
that: "[T]he failure to close the sale on April 15, 1994, did
not constitute a breach of the contract since such was not a
firm date as is evidenced by the February 3, 1994, addendum".
(emphasis added) Mrs. Crowley successful defended against the
Coons' claims that she had breached the Real Estate Purchase
Contract by refusing to close.

Paragraph 17 of the Real

Estate Purchase Contract states "ATTORNEY'S FEES.

In any

action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees."
It is undisputed that Mrs. Crowley was the prevailing party on
the issue of whether or not she breached the Real Estate
Purchase Contract.

Nevertheless, in fashioning what the

arbitrator deemed to be an "equitable" remedy, the arbitrator
exceeded his powers in failing to enforce the attorney's fee
-13-

provision of the parties' contract, and in failing to award
Mrs. Crowley her costs and attorney's fees, thus making the
arbitration award invalid.
E.

Golden Meadows is entitled to an award of interest, late
fees, penalties, costs and attorney's fees
Golden Meadows purchased from Zions Mortgage Company for

valid consideration, Coons' construction loan, resulting in
Zions

Mortgage

Company

assigning

its

interest

in

the

Construction Loan Agreement, Trust deed Note and Trust Deed to
Golden Meadows. It is undisputed that as of August 15, 1994,
Coonses were in default of the terms and conditions of the
Construction Loan Agreement and Trust Deed Note.
Arbitration Award the arbitrator specifically

In the

found that

fl

[G]olden Meadows, Inc. is the successor-in-interest in and to

the Construction Loan, Trust Deed, and Deed of Trust, having
acquired the same on August 15, 1994, by assignment from Zions
Mortgage

Company

$176,916.64."

for

the

recited

consideration

of

Nevertheless, the arbitrator failed to award

Golden Meadows its interest, penalties, late fees, costs and
attorney's

fees

as

provided

by

the

Construction

Loan

Agreement, Trusteed Deed Not and/or Trust Deed, opting instead
for a more "equitable" result. This action of the arbitrator
invalidates his award.
F.

Coons is entitled to no award whatsoever
Coons was not a licensed contractor during the relevant
-14-

period of time at question herein.

Utah Code Ann. §58-55-604

precludes all contractors from commencing or maintaining any
action for collection or compensation without alleging and
proving that the contractor was "properly licensed when the
contract sued upon was entered into and when the alleged cause
of action arose".

Coons fails on both accounts.

Instead of

disposing of this matter in short order pursuant to state law,
the arbitrator, arbitrarily ruled that Coons did not need a
license since he was an "owner and built the house on
speculation for his own occupancy". While that may have been
true at one point in time, he waived that position by agreeing
to build the house for Mrs. Crowley.

The day he signed the

Real Estate Purchase Contract with Mrs. Crowley whereby he
agreed to sell Mrs. Crowley the home upon completion of its
construction,

he

ceased

building

speculation or for his own occupancy.

that

home

either

on

Even though Mr. Coons

knew that his contract's license had not been renewed, and was
suspended he nevertheless proceeded forward in performing
construction work for Mrs. Crowley.

Mr. Coons knew the

penalty for engaging in construction without a license was his
inability to commence or maintain an action for collection or
compensation and still he proceeded forward with construction
on Crowleys' home.

The arbitrator completely ignored the

applicable law on this issue in the name of equity.

In order

to fashion what the arbitrator deemed to be a more "equitable"
-15-

result, he failed to apply governing legal principles.

That

act invalidates the arbitration Award and Supplement to
Arbitration Award.

POINT II

PUBLIC POLICY DEMANDS THAT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS BE
GOVERNED BY THE SAME LEGAL STANDARDS AS
COURT PROCEEDINGS
Golden Meadows and Crowley agree that arbitration is
intended

to

be

speedier

and

less

expensive, with

less

attendant litigation, than a regular court proceeding. It was
for those reasons that they agreed to arbitrate.

However,

Golden Meadows and Crowley were under the impression that the
same legal principles and standards applied to all legal
proceedings in Utah, whether traditional court proceedings,
arbitration proceedings or other forms of alternative dispute
resolution proceedings.

Furthermore, Golden Meadows and

Crowley were under the impression, when they agreed to
arbitrate this matter, that the arbitrator was required to
follow the law and if he did not, that the Court had power to
vacate his decision.
It

is undisputed

that the

arbitrator

fashioned

"equitable" remedy in complete abrogation of the law.

an

Had a

court so exceeded its powers it would have been reversible
error. Golden Meadows and Crowleys submit that the same legal
-16-

standards and principles that govern actions before a court
should also govern actions before an arbitrator.

Golden

Meadows and Crowley have suggested alternative legal theories
upon which this Court may rely in so adopting a plain,
consistent and clear standard for all legal actions in this
state. Golden Meadows and Crowleys submit that for this Court
so to do would not unnecessarily

expand

its review or

associated litigation. In fact, by adhering to the same clear
and consistent legal standards for arbitration proceedings as
well as court proceedings, the law would be more certain, this
Court's review defined and limited, and less litigation would
follow.

Furthermore the results would be more fair and

equitable.
Golden Meadows and Crowleys are well aware of the backlog
of cases clogging courts in this and every other jurisdiction
in this country. Golden Meadows and Crowley are proponents of
alternative dispute resolution engaging in it in this action.
However,

for

alternative

dispute

resolution,

including

arbitration, to be effective and to work, legal principles
have to be consistently applied.

If in opting for some form

of alternative dispute resolution parties realize that they
will not know until after.the award is entered just what legal
principles

governed

the proceeding

and

then

regardless

of the outcome, this Court will

learn that
not correct

manifest errors of law of the arbitrator, as it would any
-17-

judge,

then

the

effectiveness

of

alternative

dispute

resolution is eliminated.
No one in their right mind would knowingly choose such an
arbitrary and capricious forum in which to attempt to resolve
their disputes.

Public policy and the future of alternative

dispute resolution in this state requires this Court to once
and for all to squarely face this issue, taking whatever
action

is necessary to insure that legal

standards are

consistently applied in all legal forums, whether in the
formal setting of courtroom or in the informal setting of the
conference room.

CONCLUSION

This Court has the power, authority and responsibility,
to vacate the Arbitration Award and Supplement to Arbitration
Award in this matter.

Governing legal principles have to be

applied equally to all forms of dispute resolution in this
state.

Public policy and the justice so demand.

arbitrator,

exceeded

his

powers

fashioning

Because the
"equity"

in

complete abrogation of the law the awards must be vacated.

Respectfully submitted this 4th day of September, 1996.

-18-

^T^tSfigt^:
Day, Shell & Liljenquist
Attori>eySt for Golden Meadows

Larry L.^nyxe
Attorney for Michael "and
Debra Crowley

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 4th day of September, 1996,
I served the foregoing by causing true and correct copies to
be placed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid and
addressed to Carvel R. Shaffer, 110 West Center, Bountiful,
Utah 84010.
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